Simon on the Market for Bad Legal Advice

William Simon (Columbia Law) recently posted an article critiquing academic expert opinions in aggregate litigation (h/t: Leiter).  The litigation he discusses is an employment discrimination case, but his point has relevance for mass torts.  The paper is available on SSRN here and the abstract follows.

Clients demand bad legal advice whenlegal advice can favorably influence third-party conduct or attitudeseven when it is wrong. Lawyers supply bad legal advice most readilywhen they are substantially immunized from accountability to the peopleit is intended to influence. Both demand and supply conditions for aflourishing market are in place in several quarters of the legalsystem. The resulting practices, however, are in tension with basicprofessional and academic values. I demonstrate these tensions throughcritiques of the work of academic professional responsibilityconsultants in such matters as Enron, Lincoln Savings & Loan, and aheretofore undiscussed aggregate litigation settlement. I also suggestreforms to reduce the incentives and pressures for bad advice that nowprevail.

ADL